U.S. Congress: Melamine Not the Only Deadly Export

According to the Chinese regime, over 1,000 infants remain hospitalized in Chinese hospitals due to having ingested the industrial chemical melamine in their baby formulas - which means the true number of victims will never be known - we must point out that melamine is only one of many poisonous Chinese exports. On November 20th, the 2008 Report to Congress of the U.S.- China Economic and Security Review Commission was published, endorsed by all 12 members of the bipartisan Commission.

The day after its publication, Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesman Qin stated to the Chinese press "The report was unworthy of rebuttal and the commission will never succeed in its attempt," which he declared to be to mislead the public and create obstacles for U.S. – China cooperation. According to China View, Qin said the commission should stop issuing reports of this kind and stop interfering in China's internal affairs, "so as not to further harm its own image."

Chinese government officials continue, in the face of any and every criticism, pull the usual "doomed to failure" refrain out of their hats, together with the admonishment to anyone and everyone, even if their own health and well-being may be directly affected by the regime’s actions, to "not interfere in China’s internal affairs."

The exact same words used when they defend the regime against accusations of torture, imprisonment without trail, executions, religious persecution, lack of freedom of the press, forced abortions and sterilizations, etc.

Below you will find two excepts from the report. One concerns Chinese fish exports, the other, prison labor. 20% of all fish imported to the U.S. comes from China. We have no way of knowing how many Chinese exports are produced in prisons – "labor camps" in China and Tibet, which are populated by the poor, the dissidents, the minorities, the monks and nuns, the Falun Gong, etc., often imprisoned without trial or tried behind closed doors.

Not only are Chinese products polluted from the material viewpoint – they are blood-stained as well.

Chapter 1

The United States – China Trade and Economic Relationship, Conclusions (pg. 111)

• Many fish imports from Chinese aquaculture pose a health risk because of the unsanitary conditions of some Chinese fish farms, including water polluted by untreated sewage; fish contaminated by bacteria, viruses, and parasites; and fish treated with antibiotics and other veterinary medicines that are banned in the United States as dangerous to human health.

• Since 2001, China has become the world’s dominant seafood exporter, due in large part to the government’s promotion of industrial fish farming and the application of extensive government subsidies to the industry, including cheap fuel, outright construction grants, and free use of reservoirs and rivers.

• China is building an industrialized aquaculture sector through the use of extensive subsidies. In addition to producing food for domestic consumption, China has succeeded in creating a large aquaculture export industry as part of the government’s overall industrial policy. As a result, China now is the largest volume exporter of fish to the United States, shipping more than one billion pounds annually, or one in five pounds of seafood eaten by Americans.

• Import-sensitive seafood product lines in the Gulf of Mexico region of the United States, such as shrimp, crawfish, and catfish, have suffered significant declines as a result of Chinese imports. Predicted long-term trends for the Gulf seafood industry are for flat or lower sales.

• Antidumping penalties imposed by the United States on Chinese shrimp and crawfish exports sold at below market value accomplished little of their intended effect. This appears to be due in part to transshipment by China through ports of other Asian nations in order to avoid the penalty tariffs and in part to the failure to collect the penalty tariffs.

• The U.S. Food and Drug Administration (FDA), with responsibility for monitoring imports of fish, does not yet have the authority or the personnel to inspect fish farms or processors in China nor to require and enforce regulation of Chinese aquaculture by the Chinese government equivalent to U.S. Department of Agriculture requirements for foreign meat and poultry producers. The European Union, Japan, Canada, and even Hong Kong have more rigorous inspection regimes.

• The FDA lacks the authority to seize and destroy seafood shipments it has rejected for import into the United States. In some cases, the FDA must relinquish the fish to the shipper, which has led to a practice known as ‘"port shopping" in which importers try to bring seafood rejected at one U.S. port through another one. The situation is exacerbated by the fact that it takes the FDA, on average, a year to notify U.S. ports of the potential for a banned shipment to attempt to enter at another port. The FDA also lacks the authority to order a mandatory recall of seafood or even to block imports of Chinese seafood at the request of Chinese officials.

• In an effort to forestall epidemic diseases due to overcrowding and to compensate for the use of water polluted by agricultural fertilizers, industrial wastes, and partially treated sewage, Chinese fish farmers, acting on unscientific advice, often add chemicals and pharmaceuticals to the water of their farms.

• The challenge of assuring that Chinese-produced seafood meets minimal quality standards is exacerbated by the fact that there is little traceability or accountability of the products of China’s 4.5 million fish farms and one million processors, most of them small operations whose products are aggregated by wholesalers and processors.

• The current form of a memorandum of agreement addressing seafood safety and related procedures that is being negotiated by the U.S. and People’s Republic of China governments would allow the U.S. Food and Drug Administration to monitor the performance of various Chinese government agencies in ensuring the safety of China’s seafood exports but would not provide the FDA with the authority to conduct its own inspections in China.

• The current Country of Origin Label regulations pertaining to imported fish are ineffective because of the many exemptions the law provides.

Chapter 6

China’s Compliance with Agreements Pertaining to Its Export to the United States of Prison Labor Products, Conclusions (pg. 330)

• The Chinese government has not complied with its commitments under the 1992 Memorandum of Understanding and the supplementary 1994 Statement of Cooperation with the United States related to prison labor exports to the United States. It particularly has failed to comply with the requirement that it grant permission for U.S. authorities to visit suspect prison labor sites within 60 days of receipt of a U.S. request to do so. Consequently, these agreements have been ineffective in enabling the U.S. government to ensure that Chinese prison labor products are not imported into the United States.

• The official PRC position that "reeducation through labor" represents an administrative sanction rather than a form of prison incarceration, and that it therefore is not covered by prison labor agreements, leaves a large portion of the Chinese penal system outside the scope of the prison labor agreements between the U.S. and Chinese governments. The U.S. government does not agree with the Chinese government’s characterization of "reeducation through labor" as distinct from prison incarceration. The Chinese government’s refusal to include "reeducation through labor" facilities in the scope of prison labor agreements eliminates any realistic possibility that the United States reliably can identify sources of goods manufactured with prison labor and
prevent their importation into the United States.

• The import of prison labor goods into the United States is illegal. Although it is likely that prison labor products represent only a small fraction of Chinese-manufactured products imported into the United States, the preponderance of evidence suggests that Chinese prison-made goods continue to enter the U.S. market.

• The current failure effectively to enforce U.S. law prohibiting importation of prison labor products has established a perverse set of incentives for U.S. importers and their retail partners in which those willing to purchase prison labor products from Chinese suppliers may achieve and retain with impunity a competitive
advantage over competitors who source from legitimate manufacturers.

• U.S. businesses that have cause to believe a competitor may be importing products manufactured with prison or other forced labor, thereby gaining an unfair competitive pricing advantage, currently have no private right of action to pursue civil claims against that competitor.

Read the entire report:
http://www.uscc.gov/annual_report/2008/annual_report_full_08.pdf

The report is composed of the following chapters:
Chapter 1: The United States - China Trade and Economic Relationship
Chapter 2: China’s Activities Directly Affecting U.S. Security Interests
Chapter 3: China’s Energy and Environment Policies and Activities
Chapter 4: China’s Foreign Activities and Relationships
Chapter 5: China’s Media and Information Controls - The Impact in China and the United States
Chapter 6: China’s Compliance with Agreements Pertaining to its Export to the United States of Prison Labor Products

Defend Human Rights - Boycott Chinese products